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The authors estimate the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005) on U.K. data. Their estimates suggest that price stickiness is a more important
source of nominal rigidity in the United Kingdom than wage stickiness. Their estimates of
parameters governing investment behavior are only well behaved when post-1979 observations
are included, which reflects government policies until the late 1970s that obstructed the influence
of market forces on investment. (JEL E31, E32, E52)
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and Wouters; portions of the BEQM model are
estimated over a considerably shorter sample
than CEE consider for the United States, and
there are deviations from explicit optimization
in the dynamics of the BEQM model.
All in all, it is probably fair to say that there
has been considerably less work done for the
United Kingdom in terms of DSGE modeling
with systems estimation than there has been for
other economies. But U.K. data may contain a
type of information that is ideal for estimation
of a DSGE model—specifically, information on
private sector responses to policy actions. As the
present governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn
King, observed some 30 years ago,
Maintenance of the existing order and existing
rates produces no information, whereas more
information can be obtained by making
changes. In this respect the U.S....is at a dis-
advantage by comparison with the U.K. A good
illustration of this is afforded by the excite-
ment generated amongst American economists
in the 1960s by the investment tax credit and
the attempts to assess its effects. A British
economist would have shrugged this off as a
I
n this paper we estimate a dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
with nominal rigidities for the U.K. econ-
omy. The model we estimate is due to
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005; CEE)
and has become a benchmark, matching impor-
tant aspects of the U.S. data while also being
derived from optimizing behavior.
Interest in DSGE modeling of the United
Kingdom has been heightened in recent years
with the introduction of the Bank of England
quarterly model (BEQM) into the U.K. monetary
policy process. This model is based to a consider-
able degree on explicit optimizing foundations;
see Harrison et al. (2005) for the model and Pagan
(2005) for a discussion. BEQM is, however, dis-
similar in important respects from the CEE model
of the United States and the variant of the CEE
model that Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate
for the euro area. These dissimilarities make it
difficult to use BEQM to compare the structure
of the U.K. economy with that of other economies.
For example, the estimation procedure for BEQM
is different from that used by CEE and by Smets
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witnessed over the years. (King, 1977, p. 6)
This observation, though made with reference
to the changes wrought in U.K. fiscal policy up
to the 1960s, applies tenfold to monetary policy
experience in the period since the 1960s. Over
that period, the United Kingdom has undergone
great variation in inflation, interest rates, and
monetary regimes.1 It is true that for estimation
this is a mixed blessing because large regime
changes make it problematic to estimate a struc-
tural model over a long sample. But Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) and Sims and Zha
(2006) argue for the United States that constant-
parameter policy reaction functions may be rea-
sonable approximations even over long samples,
a view also implicit in CEE’s (2005) choice of a
1965-95 estimation period. In modeling the United
Kingdom using a DSGE model, we make a com-
promise between these positions by treating the
period since 1979 as a single regime,2 but also by
presenting results for pre-1979 and a long sam-
ple covering 1962-2005.3
We present in the following sections our
model, estimates for our main sample, and results
for the longer sample, with a discussion of other
regime-change issues.
MODEL
The model is the same as that in CEE (2005),
by now standard in the DSGE literature. The
model incorporates both nominal frictions (sticky
prices and wages) and dynamics in preferences
and production (habit formation in consumption,
investment adjustment costs, and variable capital
utilization). The pattern of timing in agents’ deci-
sions is consistent with the VAR identification
DiCecio and Nelson
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Table 1
Parameters in the Model
Parameter Description Parameter Description
β Discount factor ʾp Degree of price stickiness
α Production elasticity with respect ʾw Degree of wage stickiness
to capital
δ Depreciation rate 1/κ Elasticity of investment to p ˆK′
µ Steady-state money-growth rate 1/˃a Elasticity of utilization to r ˆk
ˈl Relative weight of leisure in utility ρ Interest rate smoothing parameter
ˈq Relative weight of real balances rπ Interest rate response to inflation
in utility
λw Wage markup ry Interest rate response to output
1/˃q Interest semi-elasticity of money r∆π Interest rate response to change
demand in inflation
b Habits parameter r∆y Interest rate response to change in
output
λf Price markup ˃ε Standard deviation of monetary policy
shock
2 Some work for the United Kingdom (e.g., Castelnuovo and Surico,
2006) focuses on 1992 as the start of the present policy regime.
But our use of a baseline sample period that starts in the late 1970s
matches the choices implied by some of the BEQM-equation esti-
mation periods (see, e.g., Harrison et al., 2005, pp. 115-20).
3 The long-sample estimates are the U.K. analogue to the Del Negro
et al. (2005) treatment of the U.S. sample 1954-2004 as a single
regime (including an unchanged inflation target).
1 Various advantages of the U.K. data for testing macroeconomic
hypotheses have been stressed by Ravn (1997) (evaluating a real
business cycle model against the behavior of U.K. real aggregates),
Nelson and Nikolov (2004) (using a small New Keynesian model
to evaluate different U.K. policy regimes), and Benati (2004)
(assessing the behavior of U.K. data moments over the postwar
period).restriction that we use in the next section. In our
outline here of the linearized version of the model,
all variables are expressed in log-deviations from
their steady-state values. For convenience, model
parameters and variables are summarized in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Prices are governed by Calvo (1983) contracts,
augmented by indexation to the previous period’s
inflation for those firms not allowed to reoptimize
their pricing decision. The implied inflation
dynamics are given by the following Phillips
curve:
(1)
Here, hats on variables indicate the log-devia-
tions from steady-state values. For the nominal
interest rate and inflation terms that appear in
the model, the hatted variables are effectively
the demeaned net inflation and interest rates,
because the log-deviations are computed using
gross rates.
Nominal wages are staggered along similar
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the preceding period’s price inflation. This pro-
duces the nominal wage equation:
(2)
where
Firms’ optimality conditions imply that their
total payments for capital services equal their
total cost of hiring labor each period:
(3)
Underlying this condition is the assumption
that firms finance their wage bill with funds bor-
rowed one period earlier. Real unit labor costs are
therefore (in log terms) equal to the sum of the real
wage and the short-term nominal interest rate.
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Table 2
Variable Definitions
Variable Description Variable Description
m ˆ Real money supply π ˆ Inflation
q ˆ Households’ demand for money w ˆ Real wage
k ˆ Capital services r ˆk Rental rate on capital
k
– ˆ Physical capital µ ˆ Growth rate of nominal money stock
l ˆ Labor p ˆK′ Price of capital
c ˆ Consumption U ˆ
C Marginal utility of consumption
i ˆ Investment R ˆ Nominal interest rate
y ˆ Output
4 See Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) for the development of
this form of staggered wage contracts.The typical household’s intertemporal Euler
equation for consumption and first-order condi-
tion for capital purchases are, respectively,
(4)
(5)
Because of habit formation in preferences, the
household marginal utility of consumption that
appears in the above expressions is not a static
function of consumption. Instead, it depends on
the current, prior, and expected future levels of
consumption:
(6)
The economy’s technology allows additional
productive services to be generated, at a cost, from
an unchanged stock of physical capital. The
degree of capital utilization—that is, the differ-
ence between the physical capital stock (denoted
by an overbar) and capital services—is chosen by
households to equate marginal cost with marginal
benefit:
(7)
where 1/˃a is the elasticity of the utilization
function.
The equilibrium condition for household
investment choices can be written as
(8)
This condition indicates that the price firms pay
for capital services is a function of two parameters
that emerge from the behavior of households
(who are the producers and suppliers of capital
services): the households’ discount factor, β, and
the elasticity of their investment adjustment cost
function, 1/κ.
The stock of physical capital obeys the law
of motion:
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(9)
where δ denotes the depreciation rate. Though
physical investment is subject to adjustment costs,
equation (9) indicates that a unit of investment
adds to the physical capital stock in a standard
manner.
Households’ money demand function is
given by
(10)
a condition that indicates the standard choice
between holding money for the transaction serv-
ices it provides5 or, instead, holding one-period
securities for interest income.
The following identity relates growth of
nominal money supply to inflation and changes
in real money supply:
(11)
The aggregate demand for money in the
economy comes from two sources: demand by
firms (to finance their wage bill) and by house-
holds as given by condition (10). In equilibrium,
total money demand is equal to the aggregate
money stock:
(12)
The resource constraint and the aggregate
production function can be written as
(13)
(14)
Equation (13) indicates that resources this period
can be consumed, invested, or used to generate
additional capital utilization. Equation (14) indi-
cates that the two inputs in production are labor
and capital services.
Monetary policy follows a dynamic version
of the Taylor rule:
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5 Because of habit formation, prior and expected future transactions
create a demand for real balances—i.e., money over and above the
demand generated by current transactions.(15)
The short-term nominal interest rate is therefore
a smoothed function of inflation, output, and
changes in inflation and output. There is also a
monetary policy shock, εt. This rule is similar to
that in Smets and Wouters (2003) and Levin et al.
(2005).
Other than our use of an interest rate rule,
the model we use corresponds to the CEE bench-
mark. A limitation in our application to the U.K.
data is that the CEE model describes a closed
economy. But there are several reasons for using
a closed-economy model when analyzing the
United Kingdom; see Neiss and Nelson (2003)
for a discussion. For the present paper, the main
reasons why a closed economy of the DSGE model
might be suitable for the United Kingdom are as
follows: (i) Openness makes it difficult to model
capital formation endogenously, whereas the
presence of endogenous capital is a key feature
of the CEE model. And (ii) the simplest open-
economy models give counterfactual weight to
the exchange rate in consumer price inflation
dynamics; once the exchange-rate channel is
“tamed” by such approaches as assuming incom-
plete pass-through, imported intermediates, etc.,
the model’s properties become more like those of
a closed economy (see, e.g., Obstfeld, 2002).
ESTIMATION
To estimate the model, we first obtain data
responses to a monetary policy shock from a
vector autoregression (VAR) for the United
Kingdom. Then, as in CEE, we match these
impulse responses as closely as possible with
the CEE model, using a minimum-distance esti-
mation procedure.6 Our analysis here is limited
to monetary policy shocks, but there is evidence
for the United States that estimates of the CEE
model are robust to incorporating technology
shocks into the analysis (see DiCecio, 2005, and
Altig et al., 2005).
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VAR Estimates
We estimate our VAR on a U.K. dataset con-
sisting of a subset of the variables studied in the
U.S. case by CEE. Our VAR contains the logs of
real gross domestic product (GDP), real consump-
tion,7 real investment, and labor productivity, as
well as the nominal Treasury bill rate and the
quarterly (retail) inflation rate.8 As these choices
imply, our focus is on the response of the policy
rate, inflation, and aggregate demand to a mone-
tary policy shock, as well as the split of aggregate
demand among its components and the division
of the output response between labor and other
inputs.
The sample period is 1979:Q2–2005:Q4. The
start date is the quarter corresponding to the
period (May 1979) in which the Thatcher govern-
ment first took office—and so an important mone-
tary policy regime change.9 It also corresponds
approximately to the date of some other significant
changes in government policy that are important
for the VAR responses, as we discuss in the next
section.
Figure 1 plots the estimated VAR responses
to a monetary policy shock and their bootstrapped
confidence intervals, along with the match to
each response made by our estimates of the CEE
model; the model-based responses are the blue
lines. Parameters fixed in estimation are given in
Table 3.
Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates resulting from this
matching of impulse responses are given in
Table 4. Standard errors for the parameter esti-
mates appear in parentheses and are calculated
by the asymptotic delta method.10
DiCecio and Nelson
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6 This procedure was also used with a smaller VAR by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997).
7 We have not split consumption between durables and non-
durables. VAR impulse responses in Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe
(2002, Chart 2), using a different VAR specification and sample
period from ours, found similar response functions for the two
types of consumption.
8 Our VAR does not include a time trend. Impulse responses look
similar regardless of whether a linear trend is included in the VAR.
9 See, e.g., Goodhart (1989) for a perspective on this regime change.
10 See Newey and McFadden (1994, p. 2145).The parameter indexing habit formation in
consumption is larger than that estimated by CEE
and Altig et al. (2005) but is basically in line with
Fuhrer (2000). So the degree of habit formation
in the United Kingdom appears similar to U.S.
estimates.
The markup estimate is, at somewhat above 2,
high by the standards of calibrated and estimated
DSGE models. It is, however, roughly in line with
the estimate of the average U.K. gross markup (in
manufacturing) by Haskel, Martin, and Small
(1995, p. 30) of 2.0. Our high markup estimate
appears more standard if it is regarded as the
wedge between consumer prices and (principally)
nominal wages,11 including the impact of cost
elements we have not modeled explicitly.12 It
should be remembered that the model is an
abstraction of a model with imported intermedi-
ate goods and indirect taxes. With these unmod-
eled elements built into the empirical price-level
series, the estimated markup of retail prices on
nominal wages is increased.13
The estimated interest rate policy rule has
responses to both the level and growth rate of
inflation as well as to the deviation of output
from the steady state. Because the interpretation
DiCecio and Nelson
220 JULY/AUGUST 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW





Inflation     




Output        




Consumption   








Investment    














Estimated and Model Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
12 By contrast, Haskel, Martin, and Small’s (1995) markup estimate
allows for costs of materials, so our markup estimate should be
higher than theirs, other things equal.
13 Therefore, our high estimate may be consistent with Britton,
Larsen, and Small (2000) setting the U.K. steady-state markup
value closer to 1.0 when calibrating a model with explicit imported
intermediates.
11 Interest on the nominal wage bill also enters the cost expression,
with implications we discuss shortly.of the inflation responses is affected by the output
response, we deal with the latter response first.
As technology shocks are held constant, any out-
put movements reflect the opening of the output
gap and so also inflationary pressure. It is pre-
cisely this type of output variation that a monetary
authority will have greatest interest in stabilizing.
This may account for the output response being
larger than is usual in estimated interest rate
rules, which typically do not remove from the
output measure the variation that is due to tech-
nology shocks.
The monetary policy reaction to inflation
consists of a standard level response and a nega-
tive response to the change in inflation. We find
that the inflation-change response, although not
very precisely estimated, is negative and economi-
cally sizable. Under some parameter values, an
estimated negative response to the change in
inflation implies that policymakers have lagged
inflation rather than current inflation in their rule.
Our estimated r∆π response is, however, too large
(in absolute value) for this to be the case. Instead,
policymakers actually make different-signedshort-
run responses to inflation, initially allowing a
temporary reduction in the interest rate when
inflation rises. To understand this response, one
has to keep in mind the supply side of the CEE
model. In the standard sticky-price model, the
impulse responses of output and the output gap
to a monetary policy shock are identical, because
potential output depends on real shocks only. In
the CEE model, however, this is not the case,
because interest rates enter the production func-
tion, implying that potential output depends on
the nominal interest rate (see Ravenna and Walsh,
2006, for further discussion). Holding constant its
other effects, a cut in the interest rate stimulates
potential output and helps inflation stabilization in
the face of upward pressure on aggregate demand.
Therefore, in the wake of a monetary policy shock,
policymaker stabilization of the output gap and
inflation takes a three-pronged approach: a large
response to output to rein in incipient excessive
aggregate demand (ry > 0, r∆y > 0); a short-run cut
in the interest rate as inflation rises to stimulate
potential output (r∆π < 0); and a sizable and durable
DiCecio and Nelson
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Table 4



























NOTE: The number of impulse-response steps used, which
ideally should be determined statistically (see Hall et al., 2007),
is 25. A diagonal matrix is used to weight the responses.
Table 3







ˈl Such that l = 1
ˈq Such that q/m = 0.25
λw 1.05positive response of the interest rate to the level
of inflation relative to the target (rπ > 1).
The estimates imply large investment adjust-
ment costs, mainly driven by the matching of the
smoother investment responses after the initial
period; the model does not match the apparent
initial spike in investment observed in the data.
Although the model allows for both wage
stickiness and indexation of wages to price infla-
tion, our parameter estimates imply that both
these features are absent.14 On the other hand,
price stickiness is substantial. Because full index-
ation of prices is superimposed on this price
adjustment, it is not appropriate to infer from
the low implied Calvo probability that prices are
implausibly rigid; rather, the indexation implies
substantial price movements every period, even
with the underlying price stickiness. Empirical
support for lagged inflation terms in the Phillips
curve, when this parameter is estimated freely, is
not universal (see, e.g., Ireland, 2001), so our
assumption of full indexation may be restrictive.
A lagged inflation term in the Phillips curve is,
however, in line with the specification advocated
by Blake and Westaway (1996) for U.K. monetary
policy analysis.
The bottom line is that the estimates suggest
that an emphasis on price stickiness as opposed
to wage stickiness is appropriate in analyzing the
United Kingdom. This emphasis is consistent
with evidence for other European countries, such
DiCecio and Nelson
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Estimated and Model Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock, 1962:Q3–2005:Q4
14 That is, equation (2) collapses to the usual static labor-supply
condition, equating real wages to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure.as Coenen, Levin, and Christoffel’s (2007) study
of nominal rigidities in Germany.
Factor utilization is not found to be important,
the relevant parameter being driven to the bound-
ary of its admissible region. Our VAR productivity
responses are not very precisely estimated. Con-
sequently, the model can explain output variation
in terms of input responses and therefore has
little need to rely on the intensive margin to
explain the data responses.
ESTIMATES INCLUDING
PRE-1979 DATA
In this section we present results for the long
sample 1962-2005 as well as a sample using only
pre-1979 data. The long-sample impulse responses
and their matches are given in Figure 2, and those
for the pre-1979 sample are given in Figure 3.
Parameter estimates for each sample are given in
Table 5.
Turning to the policy rule first, the estimates
deliver substantially lower inflation responses
in the interest rate rule pre-1979, consistent with
the assignment of inflation control to nonmone-
tary devices in the United Kingdom before 1979.
But the response is large enough even in this sam-
ple period to deliver determinacy (i.e., a single-
model equilibrium).15 The output response is
“wrongly” (negatively) signed pre-1979. This may
DiCecio and Nelson
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Estimated and Model Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock, 1962:Q3–1979:Q1
15 Our estimation routine considers only parameter combinations
that deliver a single solution. An alternative procedure, which we
have not pursued here, would be to consider both determinacy
and indeterminacy regions and select a solution in the latter case
using the minimal state-variable procedure.be another reflection of the lack of monetary pol-
icy response to inflationary pressure because, as
noted earlier, the output coefficient captures
responses to the specific type of output increases
that are likely to raise inflation. An additional
departure from our baseline estimates is that both
sets of estimates that include pre-1979 data have
a more standard (i.e., positive) interest rate
response to the change in inflation.
A major feature of the structural parameters
when we move away from our baseline sample is
that there is now sizable nominal wage rigidity.
Another difference from our baseline structural
parameter estimates pertains to investment behav-
ior. In the pre-1979 sample, the model cannot
match the empirical investment impulse response;
the best the model can do is to suppress invest-
ment altogether (and so generate a flat investment
model response in Figure 3). Accordingly, the
investment adjustment-cost parameter estimate
becomes arbitrarily large.
It is tempting to suggest that our anomalous
results for investment occur because the estimates
including pre-1979 data are distorted by the exis-
tence of unmodeled breaks in monetary policy
regime. But this does not really provide a satis-
factory answer why we get these particular results.
It is not obvious that estimated impulse responses
over a sample that includes multiple regimes will
be perverse in their shape; they are, more or less,
DiCecio and Nelson
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(0.0002) (0.0002)an average of the responses observed across each
regime, we should expect them to be of standard
shape. Instead of this, we get model estimates
that appear to extinguish the investment portion
of aggregate demand.
It is likely instead that U.K. government policy
is indeed the culprit for the anomalies in the pre-
1979 results, but the policy actions responsible
were microeconomic interventions in the econ-
omy and not monetary policy. Before the 1980s,
many large industries (e.g., steel and telecommu-
nications) were principally government-owned.
What is more, in a misguided effort to control
inflation by nonmonetary means, governments
frequently intervened in the pricing decisions of
their enterprises. For example, George Brown,
then Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, in
1965 said that the government was operating a
price-control policy “in the field of government
responsibility so far as charges for which they
are responsible, prices which are their responsi-
bility…”(Glasgow Herald, 1965). Ted Heath,
prime minister 1970-74, said shortly before being
elected that “we are going to see to it that the
State does not put up its prices and charges with
gay abandon” (Russell, 1970). The attempt to
enforce this policy led to considerable interfer-
ence in government enterprises’ operations, so
much so that Anthony Crosland, a leading Labour
Party figure, cited 1970-71 as a period that dis-
played a poor “balance…between Ministerial
control and entrepreneurial freedom” (Crosland,
1974, p. 39).
From around 1978, however, it became much
more standard for government-owned enterprises
to base their pricing and investment decisions
on market signals, with a government report on
the subject in 1978 stating that the “Government
intends that the nationalized industries will not
be forced into deficits by restraints on their
prices”(House of Commons, 1979). The step-
ping away by government from management of
investment decisions was cemented by the pri-
vatization of many government enterprises in
the 1980s.
Because the pre-1978 government interven-
tions blocked investment from responding to
market signals, including those from monetary
policy shocks, one can understand why invest-
ment responses might deviate greatly from those
predicted by our model, in which investment
behavior is based on optimal firm choices. Gov-
ernment prohibitions on a firm’s ability to raise
prices might cut off funds to the firm, thus dis-
torting investment decisions. On the other hand,
for given monetary policy, government interven-
tion in investment decisions might merely trans-
fer aggregate demand pressure from investment
to other categories of spending, rather than affect
total demand. So impulse responses other than
those for investment might still be compatible
with the model, which is essentially what we find.
EXTENSIONS
In this section, we report further results regard-
ing the robustness of our results to alternative
data definitions (under “Alternative Investment
Series”) and our choice of regime dates (under
“VAR Stability and Regime Breaks”).
Alternative Investment Series
The BEQM model and such sources as the
Bank of England Inflation Report use a slightly
narrower definition of investment than we use
in our analysis. This narrower definition is
known as “business investment” (though, like
our series, it includes investment by government
enterprises).
We use this alternative investment series and
examine the effect on our results. In Figure 4,
we show that using this series in our VAR makes
little difference in the empirical responses to a
monetary policy shock.16 The parameter estimates
using this series are given in Table 6. These are
little changed from the baseline parameter esti-
mates, with some important exceptions. Most
notably, the policy rule estimates are much less
precisely estimated and feature a much lower
DiCecio and Nelson
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16 The sample period we now use, 1980:Q1–2005:Q4, is slightly
shorter than the 1979:Q2–2005:Q4 sample we used for our base-
line results, owing to difficulty obtaining parameter estimates for
1979-2005 with the business investment series.estimated response to output; and the alternative
estimates give roughly equal importance to price
and wage stickiness, whereas in the baseline esti-
mates prices were much stickier than wages.
VAR Stability and Regime Breaks
As noted above, our data cover the whole
1962-2005 period, but our baseline structural
estimates are based on a sample covering only
the period since the late 1970s, reflecting the
changes in U.K. industrial and monetary policies
that took place around that time. To investigate
further the issue of regime break dates, in Table 7
we follow Boivin and Giannoni (2002, p. 99) by
investigating the stability of the VAR when it is
estimated for the long sample 1962:Q1–2005:Q4.
We report the p-values for the constancy of the
coefficients associated with each group of regres-
sors in the VAR. The break dates suggested by
the test are also reported, and those highlighted
in bold achieve statistical significance at the 10
percent level or better.
The results for the baseline VAR specifica-
tion—that is, the VAR specification underlying
the Figure 2 impulse responses—occupy the top
half of the table. The results suggest a significant
break in the inflation equation around 1975:Q2.
This date, however, does not constitute a mone-
tary policy regime break; instead, the mid-1975
instability reflects a one-time shock to industrial
policy. The previously described U.K. government
policy of holding down nationalized industries’
DiCecio and Nelson
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Estimated and Model Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock, with Alternative Investment Series,
1980:Q1–2005:Q4prices underwent an adjustment in this period,
with prices allowed to rise to eliminate the accu-
mulated discrepancy with costs. The large effect
on consumer prices that resulted has sometimes
been categorized as tantamount to a substantial
increase in indirect taxes (Wilson, 1984, p. 50).
The test statistics mechanically take this large
shock as evidence of regime change, though,
economically, it does not amount to the sort of
change in systematic policy responses that truly
qualify as a policy regime shift. The remaining
stability rejections are spread over 1977-81 and
so are roughly in line with our assumption of a
1979 break date.
Recall that our VAR does not use detrended
real data, nor does it include a trend as a regressor.
Some work on U.S. data—e.g., Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997), Boivin and Giannoni (2002),
and Giannoni and Woodford (2005)—detrends
real variables before putting them in the VAR. We
report in the bottom half of Table 7 the stability
results for our VAR when our specification is
modified by replacing the four real variables with
their detrended counterparts. The detrending
assumes that the log real variables are driven by
a broken linear trend, with constant and trend
breaks in both 1973:Q4 and 1981:Q4.
Besides continuing to show a break in 1975 in
some of the inflation coefficients, these stability
results largely reaffirm a focus on a regime break
around the early 1980s (specifically, 1980 or 1981).
Two of the significant rejections of stability do
suggest a break in 1984 in GDP and productivity
behavior, but these rejections can be discounted
as reflecting the temporary disturbances to out-
put from the coal-mining strike of that year.
One puzzling aspect of the results with
detrended variables is that the interest rate equa-
tion no longer registers any significant regime
break. This, however, is not decisive evidence
against the importance of monetary policy regime
change. For one thing, relatively minor and sta-
tistically insignificant changes in the VAR coeffi-
cients can imply large changes in the implied
“long-run response” of the interest rate to endoge-
nous variables. This is the case here because,
despite the lack of rejection of stability, the VAR
equation for the interest rate underlying the final
row of the table has a long-run solution with an
interest rate response to (annualized) inflation of
about 0.3; but this response rises to 1.0 on restrict-
ing the sample to 1979-2005.17 Furthermore, the
inflation VAR equation now exhibits a significant
early-1980s break, which is indirect support for a
monetary policy regime change around that time.
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17 In some contexts (see, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, and
Rudebusch, 1998) the VAR equation for the interest rate coincides
with the interest rate policy rule. This is not the case in our analysis,
as the policy rule that we use in estimation differs from the VAR
equation. But solving the reduced-form VAR interest rate equation
for its long-run solution nevertheless provides a means of cross-
checking the stability test results.CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have estimated the
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) model
on U.K. data. Although CEE found plausible esti-
mates on U.S. data when treating the period since
the 1960s as a single regime, for the United
Kingdom it appears that more satisfactory esti-
mates emerge if pre-1979 data are excluded; other-
wise, the estimates imply degenerate behavior of
investment. This result is consistent with policy
regime changes being an important factor in the
postwar U.K. economy. These regime changes
include not only changes in the role assigned to
monetary policy but also shifts toward making
investment decisions more closely related to
market forces. Another important implication of
our estimates is that price stickiness, rather than
wage stickiness, is the major source of nominal
rigidity in the United Kingdom.
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Table 7
VAR Stability Tests, 1962:Q3–2005:Q4
Regressor
Dependent variable π yci y –h r
1. Baseline VAR specification
π 0.002 0.001 0.713 0.153 0.510 0.574
1975:Q2 1977:Q1 1975:Q3 1971:Q1 1970:Q4 1973:Q2
y 0.127 0.682 0.373 0.358 0.948 0.347
1972:Q3 1975:Q3 1990:Q2 1976:Q1 1975:Q3 1977:Q4
c 0.469 0.444 0.001 0.012 0.001 0.008
1990:Q2 1990:Q2 1977:Q1 1980:Q2 1977:Q1 1980:Q2
i 0.553 0.844 0.788 0.195 0.524 0.711
1973:Q1 1968:Q4 1976:Q1 1979:Q2 1975:Q3 1975:Q3
y – h 0.382 0.943 0.922 0.869 0.361 0.199
1973:Q2 1975:Q3 1973:Q2 1973:Q2 1990:Q2 1974:Q1
r 0.275 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.471
1977:Q4 1981:Q2 1981:Q2 1977:Q4 1981:Q2 1973:Q1
2. Baseline VAR specification with y, c, i, y – h detrended
π 0.002 0.072 0.040 0.004 0.567 0.741
1975:Q2 1975:Q2 1981:Q4 1976:Q1 1978:Q4 1988:Q4
y 0.110 0.036 0.121 0.224 0.296 0.867
1972:Q3 1984:Q1 1981:Q2 1987:Q2 1981:Q4 1977:Q4
c 0.738 0.063 0.065 0.095 0.105 0.001
1970:Q1 1981:Q3 1980:Q2 1980:Q2 1975:Q2 1980:Q2
i 0.812 0.269 0.239 0.014 0.049 0.662
1968:Q4 1987:Q1 1985:Q1 1976:Q4 1980:Q1 1990:Q2
y – h 0.325 0.147 0.078 0.187 0.476 0.665
1972:Q3 1984:Q1 1984:Q1 1976:Q4 1981:Q4 1970:Q1
r 0.425 0.813 0.714 0.801 0.865 0.460
1977:Q4 1980:Q1 1986:Q1 1990:Q3 1998:Q3 1976:Q3
NOTE: Values reported are the p-values for the Andrews (1993) sup-Wald test, computed using the procedure of Diebold and Chen
(1996). The null hypothesis assumes no structural breaks, whereas the alternative hypothesis has breaks in the constant and group of
lag coefficients on the indicated regressor. Each panel also gives the break-date associated with the p-value.REFERENCES
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Data Sources and Definitions
Nominal interest rate: U.K. Treasury bill rate, quarterly average. Source: Haver-IFS, quarterly average
series.
Output: real GDP, seasonally adjusted, quarterly, series abmi.q.
Source: U.K. Office of National Statistics (ons.gov.uk), downloaded May 2006.
Private household consumption: seasonally adjusted, quarterly, series abjr.q.
Source: ons.gov.uk, downloaded May 2006.
Investment: gross fixed capital formation, seasonally adjusted, quarterly, series npqt.q.
Source: ons.gov.uk, downloaded May 2006.
Alternative investment series: business investment at 2003 prices, seasonally adjusted, quarterly,
series npel.q.
Source: ons.gov.uk, downloaded August 2006.
Productivity: Y/H, where H = hours worked.
Source for H: series ybus.q (source: U.K. Office of National Statistics [ONS]), with splice into Ravn
(1997) U.K. hours worked series to obtain pre-1971:Q1 data.
Inflation: log difference of P, where P is a seasonally adjusted consumer price series. P was constructed
as follows: A quarterly average of the retail price index (RPI) was spliced into a quarterly average of
RPIX (RPI excluding mortgage interest payment) after 1973, the series was seasonally adjusted, then
tax-related spikes of 4 percent (in 1979:Q3) and 2 percent (1990:Q2) were removed from the series.
The seasonal regressions underlying the seasonal adjustment used the log-change as the dependent
variable, and seasonal patterns were allowed to differ across 1955-76, 1976-86, and 1987-2005.
Source for the monthly RPI underlying the quarterly averages: ONS (ons.gov.uk). The ONS, however,
provides RPIX data only from January 1987. An unofficial RPIX series starting in 1974 has, however,
been constructed at the Bank of England, and this series underlies studies such as Nelson and Nikolov
(2004) and Benati (2004). The OECD-Haver service also provides an RPIX series (though beginning
only in 1975) that closely matches this series. We used the quarterly average of the unofficial RPIX
series for 1974-87 and spliced it into the quarterly average of the official RPIX series that begins in
1987. Splicing this RPIX series at 1974:Q1 with RPI delivered the RPI/RPIX quarterly average series
underpinning P.
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